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REVOLUTIONS IN CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION: 






I .  Introduction 
 
A spectre is haunting contractual interpretation – the spectre of history. It is well known that, in 
recent decades, a ‘fundamental change’ has overtaken the law of contractual interpretation, as 
‘the old intellectual baggage of “legal” interpretation’ has been replaced with ‘common sense’ 
ideas about language.1 The meaning of a contract is no longer to be determined by the meaning 
of its words, but by ‘what the parties using those words against the relevant background would 
reasonably have been understood to mean’.2 Furthermore, disparate aspects of contract law, 
from the implication of terms to the remoteness rule in damages, have been recast as facets of 
interpretation.3 For writers outlining these changes, it has become traditional to throw them into 
sharp relief with a reference to what came before. Indeed, it is now almost impossible to open a 
book about contract law without encountering Wigmore’s remark that ‘The history of the law of 
interpretation is the history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious formalism to a flexible 
rationalism’.4 
 
Some questions remain. Was Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Investors Compensation Scheme 
a radical move in this direction, or simply one step in a more gradual trend? The basic premise, 
however, is rarely doubted: a stricter attitude to construction is the more ‘traditional’ approach 
of English law.5 One reason for this is that few writers venture further back than a century or so 																																																								
* Clare College, University of Cambridge. The research for this chapter was funded by the Selden Society. 
I am grateful to Andrew Bell and Jeffrey Thomson for their comments, and to Lorenzo Maniscalco for his 
help with Latin translations. 
1 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912, per Lord Hoffmann. 
2 ibid 913. 
3 See generally Catherine Mitchell, ‘Obligations in Commercial Contracts: A Matter of Law or 
Interpretation?’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 455. 
4 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence, vol 9, 3rd edn (Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1940) 187. See, eg, Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 5th edn (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 3; Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 22; Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 229; Lord Nicholls, ‘My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words’ (2005) 121 LQR 
577, 577; Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 AC 251, 265. 
5 See, eg, McMeel, Construction of Contracts (n 4) 24. 
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ago, when the courts were undoubtedly more wedded to the ‘plain meaning’ of the contract. If 
we have a vague idea of the further past, it is probably of a yet stricter period: a ‘primitive stage 
of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal’.6 It is 
generally admitted that no one today is an out-and-out literalist with ‘two horns and a long 
forked tail’,7 but we are willing to believe that lawyers of the past were helpless naïfs, bedazzled 
by the quasi-magical power of the written word. 
 
This chapter aims to put that idea to rest. In fact, our current liberal approach to 
contractual interpretation has deep roots in the history of the common law, perhaps even more 
so than the much-maligned ‘old baggage’ of strict construction. The history of the law of 
interpretation is not the history of a straightforward progress, but of cyclical trends. Some eras 
are undoubtedly more formalist than others, but it is not clear that anyone has ever treated 
documents in the ‘stiff and superstitious’ way it is often claimed. One indication of this is that 
there is very little agreement as to when the bogeyman of literalism actually stalked the earth. 
McMeel, for example, points to the ‘sclerotic 1950s’,8 while Denning LJ, in the 1950s, blamed 
his own forebears.9 Perhaps he was thinking of the Victorians, who often get a bad rap,10 but 
Wigmore thought that sense had only begun to break through in the nineteenth century.11 
Meanwhile, Lord Hoffmann has accused everyone from the Middle Ages on.12 
 
This chapter will focus on the mid-sixteenth century, a foundational period for 
contractual interpretation in England, and the time of a revolution that dwarfed even Lord 
Hoffmann’s. It was the setting for one of the most significant intellectual developments in 
common law history: the invention of legal interpretation. We will find that the early modern 
approach to contractual interpretation is surprisingly familiar, and that many modern debates 
on the subject had close counterparts in Renaissance England. 
 
II.  Some Background 
 
First, though, some context is necessary, since the contract law of the sixteenth century looks 																																																								
6 Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon [1917] 222 NY 88, 91, per Cardozo J. 
7 Sir Robert Goff, ‘Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court’ [1984] LMCLQ 382, 388. 
8 Gerard McMeel, ‘The Principles and Policies of Contractual Construction’ in Andrew Burrows and 
Edwin Peel (eds), Contract Terms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 29. 
9 British Movietonews v London and District Cinemas [1951] 1 KB 190, 202. 
10 Lord Bingham, ‘A New Thing under the Sun? The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision’ 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 375. 
11 Wigmore, Treatise (n 4) 189. 
12 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings’ (1997) 114 South African Law 
Journal 656, 670. 
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very different to the law today. In fact, ‘contract law’ had not yet been invented. In its place 
were a variety of actions that could be brought on what we would now describe as kinds of 
contracts. These included the action of covenant, which could only be brought on a deed, a 
formal instrument made under seal. There were also debt and detinue, which lay for the 
recovery of a definite sum of money or a specific chattel. By far the most common contractual 
action was debt sur obligation, brought to enforce a penalty clause in a type of deed known as a 
bond.13 Although the action of assumpsit was now available to enforce some informal contracts, 
the number of such cases remained relatively insignificant.14 Contracts were therefore of an 
overwhelmingly formal character. Deeds were commonplace, used for everything from 
conveyances, charterparties and building contracts to marriage agreements.15 Edward Coke 
observed that the interpretation of deeds concerned ‘every man (for, for the most part, every 
man is a lessor or a lessee)’.16 
 
These contractual actions had not accrued many substantive doctrines: if the plaintiff 
had a deed, it would almost certainly be enforced.17 As a result, the main legal issue was to 
establish the meaning of the deed.18 And this was not only true for contractual actions, since a 
case that was originally brought on an action of trespass or ejectment could end up turning on a 
question of interpretation. The defendant might have resorted to self-help, driving the plaintiff 
off his land, and only after some pleading would it be revealed that the dispute centred on the 
meaning of a title deed. 
 
The interpretation of deeds, then, formed a large part of the common law’s bread and 
butter. However, before the sixteenth century, judges were not particularly interested in 
enunciating grand theories of interpretation. As Thorne puts it, they simply saw the reading of 
documents as ‘an incidental, routine function of judicial administration’.19 This is of a piece with 
the courts’ general approach to law at the time. Baker has characterised medieval judges as 
referees, whose role was simply to apply certain rules in a predictable way, and who were not 																																																								
13 AWB Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 1st edn (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1975) 88. 
14 In Trinity term of 1572, for example, there were 503 actions of debt sur obligation, and only three of 
assumpsit: ibid 125. 
15 Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 819. 
16 Walker’s Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 22a, 23a. 
17 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 814. The exceptions were pleas of duress or non est factum: ibid 829. There 
were no doctrines of mistake, fraud or undue influence in this period: Simpson, A History of the Common Law 
of Contract (n 13) 29. 
18 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 824. 
19 Samuel Thorne (ed), A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes (San Marino, Huntington 
Library, 1942) 3. 
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expected to explain the reasons for their decisions; still less to alter the settled rules of the 
game.20 
 
However, the sixteenth century brought rapid change to the common law. Following 
the introduction of printing, the courts began to give greater weight to authoritative copies of 
written materials.21 At the same time, new humanist scholarship was encouraging a more 
rational approach to the law.22 Judges began to see it as their duty to make reasoned decisions, 
going beyond a rote application of the words of a text. It is unsurprising, therefore, that ideas 
about interpretation suddenly came to dominate the law. The courts recognised that 
interpretation could be a systematic process, and began to establish the rules and principles that 
underlay it. Techniques of interpretation were keenly debated by readers in the Inns of Court,23 
and the first English literature on the subject was produced.24 Indeed, England was not alone in 
this respect: the whole of Europe was experiencing an ‘interpretation boom.’25 
 
It is widely recognised that elaborate theories of statutory interpretation were being 
developed in this period.26 Unsurprisingly, contractual interpretation was affected too. Indeed, 
formal contracts were the documents that fell most frequently to be interpreted by the courts.27 
Changes to contract law, prompted by the rise of assumpsit, were also encouraging lawyers to 
rethink the conceptual basis of legal obligations. Ultimately, this would lead to the formulation 
of a general, agreement-based theory of contract law.28 For now, however, interpretation was 
the only game in town. Lawyers began to formulate principles for interpreting deeds, grounded 
in sophisticated ideas about contractual intentions. 
 																																																								
20 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 49. 
21 See generally Ian Williams, ‘“He Creditted More the Printed Booke”: Common Lawyers’ Receptivity 
to Print, c. 1550-1640’ 28 Law and History Review 39. 
22 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 13. 
23 See, eg, Sir John Baker (ed), John Spelman’s Reading on Quo Warranto (Selden Society 1997) 89ff. 
24 See, eg, Thorne (ed), A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes (n 19), composed c. 1565 
and usually attributed to Thomas Egerton (but see Sir John Baker, The Reinvention of Magna Carta 1216-
1616 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017) 232-6); and A Treatise Concerning Statutes, or Acts of 
Parliament, and the Exposition Thereof (London, Tonson, 1677), composed in the late sixteenth century and 
usually attributed to Christopher Hatton. 
25 Ian Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) 35. 
26 See, eg, Georg Behrens, ‘Equity in the Commentaries of Edmund Plowden’ [1999] Journal of Legal 
History 25. 
27 Dyer’s reports, which are fairly representative of the cases he was involved in, contain only around a 
dozen cases on statutory interpretation, almost 30 on the interpretation of wills, and over 70 on the 
interpretation of deeds. 
28 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 
146. 
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This chapter focuses on cases reported by Edmund Plowden and James Dyer, the two 
pre-eminent law reporters of their day. Dyer’s reports cover his own legal career, between 
around 1532 and 1581,29 while Plowden’s Commentaries span the period 1550 to 1580. Both sets 
of reports show that the courts strongly emphasised the importance of identifying and 
implementing the parties’ intentions. This was not a wholly new feature of the law: references to 
contractual intentions had been rare in the fourteenth century,30 but became increasingly 
common from the mid-fifteenth century on.31 For the first time, however, the courts were 
developing a general theory of interpretation based on the intentions behind the contract. As a 
result, when faced with a choice between strictly applying the words of a deed and following the 
parties’ intentions, the courts chose the latter in virtually every case. In fact, out of almost a 
hundred cases on the interpretation of deeds in Plowden and Dyer, there are only two in which 
the parties’ intentions appear to have been trumped by the strict meaning of the text.32 
 
III.  Contractual Interpretation in the Sixteenth Century 
 
A.  Throckmerton v  Tracy 33 
 
Throckmerton v Tracy is a good example of a mid-century case in which the court faced a 
mismatch between the technical meaning of a deed and the intentions of the parties. Henry 
Beeley, the Abbot of Tewkesbury, had granted 100 acres of land to a tenant for life. He then 
leased the reversion to John Smith for 21 years, beginning on the first Michaelmas to follow the 
death of the life tenant. John Throckmerton succeeded to Smith’s title. Fifteen years later, the 
monastery was dissolved and the Abbot’s reversion was surrendered to Henry VIII, who granted 
it to Richard Tracy, a Protestant theologian and friend of Thomas Cromwell. When the life 
tenant died, Throckmerton entered. Tracy promptly seized his sheep, provoking a lawsuit. 
 
When challenged, Tracy explained that there had been a drafting error in the Abbot’s 
lease, which meant that Throckmerton had nothing in the land. The problem was that the 
premises of the deed granted him the ‘reversion’ of the land, rather than the possession. 
However, the reversion had been immediately destroyed on the death of the life tenant, and no 
																																																								
29 Sir John Baker (ed), Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (London, Selden Society, 1994) 
xxiii. 
30 JM Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 243. 
31 See, eg, YB (1440) Mich 19 Hen 6 pl 7 f3b-4b, 4b; YB (1456) Mich 35 Hen 6 pl 25 f15b-17b, 16a; 
Southwall v Huddelston and Reynoldys (1523) Hil 14 Hen 8 pl 1 (119 SS 150) 159, 160. 
32 Anon (1554) Dyer 99b and Earl of Huntingdon v Lord Clinton (1557) Dyer 139a. 
33 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145. 
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longer existed for Throckmerton to take the following Michaelmas.34 It was simply ‘no longer in 
Being’, and he had no right to claim anything else.35 
 
Throckmerton argued that this was an incorrect interpretation of the word ‘reversion’. 
He agreed that, if it were given its ‘proper’ legal meaning, the lease would be void. However, he 
claimed, the law should ‘draw the Words from their proper and usual Signification to fulfil the 
Intention of the Parties’.36 After all, the Abbot’s intention was ‘very apparent’: he wanted to 
grant the possession of the land after the death of the life tenant, but he had fallen foul of a legal 
technicality by incorrectly using the word ‘reversion’.37 He concluded that ‘if the Intent of the 
Parties appears, the Law will construe the Words in such Sense as to perform that Intent rather 
than in any other Sense’.38 
 
Broke CJ’s response has been cited as a paradigm of sixteenth century attitudes to 
interpretation: indeed, it forms the basis for Wigmore’s assertion that contractual interpretation 
was labouring in an age of ‘stiff and superstitious formalism’.39 The Chief Justice objected that 
 
there ought to be apt Words to express the Meaning, or else the Meaning shall be 
void… for if a Man should bend the Law to the Intent of the Party, rather than the 
Intent of the Party to the Law, this would be the Way to introduce Barbarousness 
and Ignorance, and to destroy all Learning and Diligence. For if a Man was 
assured that whatever Words he made Use of his Meaning only should be 
considered, he would be very careless about the Choice of his Words, and it would 
be the Source of infinite Confusion and Incertainty to explain what was its 
Meaning.40 
 
Indeed, these concerns about legal certainty sound very convincing. Unfortunately, 
Broke’s comments were not quite as authoritative as they seem. Firstly, they were made in 
dissent: the other three judges in the case took a very different approach. Secondly, his scruples 
do not seem to have troubled him for long: ‘afterwards,’ reported Plowden, he said that ‘he was 
content that Judgment should be given for the Plaintiff’ after all.41 In fact, Dyer even recorded 																																																								
34 ibid 152a. 
35 ibid 153. The habendum of the deed correctly specified the possession of the land, but, where a deed was 
internally inconsistent, the premises would take priority: ibid 152a. 
36 ibid 153a. 
37 ibid 159. 
38 ibid 153a. 
39 Wigmore, Treatise (n 4) 188. 
40 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 162. 
41 ibid 162a. 
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that Broke had ‘prepared an argument on both sides, and if any one of his companions had 
been against the lease, he would have argued for it’.42 This is not as surprising as it may at first 
appear: the modern doctrine of precedent was in its infancy, and so there was not yet an 
assumption that everything said from the bench was intended as an authoritative judgment.43 
Finally, Broke’s remarks were entirely unrepresentative of this period, with no other judge in 
Plowden or Dyer making a similar point. Much more typical were the speeches of the three 
remaining judges, all of whom agreed that the parties’ ‘Intent shall be pursued rather than the 
Words’.44 
 
Two of these judges, Stanford and Saunders JJ, made more comprehensive attempts to 
set out the principles of contractual interpretation. Saunders J, for example, urged judges not to 
‘cavil about the Words in subversion of the plain Intent of the Parties’, which was ‘a kind of 
trickery, and an excessively clever but wicked interpretation of the law’.45 Satirising literalism, he 
referred to Cicero’s example of a general who made a truce for 130 days, and attacked his 
enemy during the night. Such interpretation was ‘meer Injury and Injustice’; ‘summum jus,’ he 
warned, was ‘summa injuria’. Instead, judges should ‘observe and follow the Intent of the Words’, 
which were ‘the Testimony of the Contract’.46 However, they could also apply other principles: 
remembering, for example, that ‘Deeds ought to have a reasonable Exposition, which shall be 
without Wrong to the Grantor, and with the greatest Advantage to the Grantee’.47 Similarly, 
Stanford J explained that there were  
 
three Rules for the Understanding of Deeds. First, that they shall be taken most 
beneficially for the Party to whom they are made; secondly, that a Deed shall never 
be void, where the Words may be applied to any Intent to make it good; and… 
thirdly, that the Words shall be construed according to the Intent of the Parties, 
and not otherwise.48  
 
These judgments are highly significant: they represent two of the first attempts to present the 
common law of interpretation as a coherent and principled system. 
 
B. The  Iden t i f i ca t i on  o f  In t en t i ons  																																																								
42 Throgmorton v Tracey (1555) Dyer 124b, 126b. 
43 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 50. 
44 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 160. 
45 ibid 161 (‘calumnia quaedam et nimis callida sed malitiosa juris interpretatio’). 
46 ibid 161a. 
47 ibid 161. 
48 ibid 160. 
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The most immediately striking feature of these judgments is the central place they give to the 
parties’ intentions. This is entirely typical of interpretation cases from the period.49 In Colthirst v 
Bejushin, for example, the defendant had been granted a life estate in certain land on condition 
that he live there continually. One question was whether he would have fulfilled the condition if 
he had lived there continually since entering the land, but did not actually enter until some time 
after the beginning of his term. Sjt Pollard argued that ‘the Intent of a Condition ought always 
to be performed as well as the Words thereof’.50 If Bejushin did not enter until ten years after the 
beginning of the term, he could hardly claim to have complied with the grantor’s intention, even 
if he had technically performed the words. While the case was ultimately decided on another 
ground, Mountague CJ accepted Pollard’s argument: ‘I would readily admit that [the condition] 
ought to be taken according to the Intent of it, that he should be resident all the Term’.51 
 
In Chapman v Dalton, counsel for the plaintiff cited Colthirst as authority for the 
proposition that a condition would not be performed if the words had been fulfilled but not the 
intention.52 In that case, the opposite question was at issue: would a covenant be performed if 
the intention had been fulfilled, but not the words? The defendant had agreed to make a lease to 
Chapman or his assigns in 21 years’ time, but Chapman died before the time elapsed. The 
defendant argued that the covenant had become impossible to perform, because Chapman had 
not named any assigns in his will. The case was brought by the executor of Chapman’s 
executrix. He claimed that the lease ought to be made to him,  
 
[f]or in every Agreement made between any Parties the Intent is the chief Thing to 
be considered, and if… the Agreement cannot be performed according to the 
Words, yet the Party shall perform it as near to the Intent of the Agreement as he 
can.53  
 
The court agreed: although an executor was not, strictly speaking, an assign, it should be 
presumed that Chapman wanted him to have the lease nevertheless. 
 
The courts, then, regarded awareness of the intention behind a legal instrument as 
essential to understanding its true effect. Indeed, it was more important than the words of the 																																																								
49 And, indeed, of sixteenth century law more generally: Louis Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: 
The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977) 44. 
50 Colthirst v Bejushin (1550) Plow 21, 23a. 
51 ibid 34. 
52 Chapman v Dalton (1565) Plow 284, 291. 
53 ibid 290. 
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contract, which only functioned as ‘testimony’ of the intention.54 But how was this intention to 
be identified? After all, as Christopher St German had put it, ‘of the entent inwarde in the herte: 
mannes lawe can not Juge’.55 And there were major impediments to ascertaining the intentions 
of the parties to a deed. For a start, a party to a case was prohibited from giving evidence on his 
own behalf in a common law court.56 Furthermore, many deeds were not challenged in court 
until the original parties were long deceased.57 Since no evidence of the parties’ actual intentions 
was generally available, the court was required to reconstruct them after the fact. 
 
Often, of course, the parties’ intentions could simply be extrapolated from the deed itself. For 
example, it would be presumed that the parties had meant the words as they were ‘commonly 
used’.58 If a word had been used in one part of the deed, it could be assumed to have the same 
meaning elsewhere:59 as Anthony Browne J and Dyer CJ observed, ‘it is impossible to form a 
Judgment upon one Part only, without taking all the Parts into Consideration’.60 In other cases, 
the courts would look at the context in which the contract had been made. In Bold v Molineux, for 
example, Bold’s father-in-law had promised to pay him £30 at the Feast of St John the Baptist 
in 1533, unless his wife died without a son ‘then living’. The question was whether ‘then living’ 
referred to the time of the Feast, or of the wife’s death. Bold argued for the latter, claiming that 
the Feast had only been named so that he ‘should have the money the sooner’.61 However, 
Fitzherbert and Baldwin JJ thought that the circumstances suggested a different intention. The 
purpose of the term had been that ‘if the issue die, the payment shall immediately cease’, as was 
‘the common practice of all men who give large sums of money with the marriage of their 
children’.62 
 
C. In t en t i ons  and  Reason  
 
In other cases, the court did not look for the intentions of the actual parties, but resorted to 
general principles to establish what a reasonable party would have intended in the 
circumstances. This is where the other ‘rules’ set out in Throckmerton came into play. For 
example, Stanford J had held that ‘a Deed shall never be void, where the Words may be applied 																																																								
54 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 161a. 
55 Christopher St German, Doctor and Student (TFT Plucknett and JL Barton eds, London, Selden Society, 
1974) 230, first published 1530. 
56 Baker, Oxford History (n 15) 364. 
57 Sir John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 
288. 
58 Hill v Grange (1556) Plow 164, 170a. 
59 Anon (1564) Dyer 233b. 
60 Wrotesley v Adams (1559) Plow 187, 196. 
61 Bold v Molineux (1536) Dyer 14b, 15b. 
62 ibid 17b. 
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to any Intent to make it good’.63 After all, it could be assumed that the parties would have 
preferred their deed to take effect, ‘rather than that the Intent of the Parties should be void’.64 
Thus, in Browning v Beston, the plaintiff claimed that insufficient words had been used to reserve a 
rent in a lease. The defendant argued that the law would take it that there was a rent, ‘as 
strongly as if it had been expressed in plain Terms’.65 As Sjt Catlyn put it, ‘our Law, which is the 
most reasonable Law upon Earth, regards the Effect and Substance of Words more than the 
Form of them, and takes the Substance of Words to imply the Form thereof’.66 
 
Another of Stanford J’s rules was that the terms of a deed ‘shall be taken most 
beneficially for the Party to whom they are made’.67 This is a form of the contra proferentem rule, 
which provides that a contractual term should be construed against the party ‘proffering’ it. 
Today, lawyers generally attribute its introduction into English law to Coke,68 but in fact, it has 
been part of the common law since at least the late fourteenth century.69 It was certainly well 
established by the time of Plowden and Dyer, and one of the participants in Edward Hake’s 
Elizabethan Dialogue on Equity volunteered that he had ‘hearde it often sayd’.70 However, Hake’s 
interlocutor also pointed out that the principle was difficult to square with an intention-based 
approach to interpretation. How, he asked, was it possible for the courts to interpret a deed in 
accordance with the intention of the parties, but also more beneficially for one party than the 
other?71  
 
It appears that the rule simply operated as a presumption, which could establish the 
parties’ intentions if they were not otherwise clear. If the grantor had the opportunity to limit his 
grant in some way and failed to do so, it could be presumed that he did not intend to limit it at 
all. After all, it was ‘the natural Principle of Mankind to act and speak according as it suits best 
with their own Interest and Advantage’.72 In Colthirst, Sjt Saunders explained that the law 
																																																								
63 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 160. 
64 Browning v Beston (1555) Plow 131, 140. 
65 ibid 134. 
66 ibid 140. 
67 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 160. 
68 See, eg, Edwin Peel, ‘Whither Contra Proferentem?’ in Burrows and Peel (eds), Contract Terms (n 8) 54. 
69 Plessington v Mowbray & Ellerton (1382) Mich 6 Ric 2 pl 17 (1996 AF 147-151) 148, per Sjt Rickhill: 
‘When a deed is made, the deed shall be taken more strongly against him who made the deed and more 
for him to whom the deed is made’.  
70 Edward Hake, Epieikeia: A Dialogue on Equity in Three Parts (DEC Yale ed, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1953) 54, composed c. 1598. 
71 ibid. 
72 Report of Plowden’s argument in Basset and Morgan v Manxel, at Serjeant’s Inn (1564) Plow 6a. 
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‘interprets the Words and Actions of every Man most strongly against himself’:73 the courts 
would not deign to rescue a party if he had been so foolish as to bind himself by words he later 
regretted. 
 
Finally, we come to Saunders J’s admonition that ‘Deeds ought to have a reasonable 
Exposition’. 74  He folded a rather diffident reference to contra proferentem into his general 
discussion of reasonable interpretation, claiming that ‘there is a Kind of Equity in Grants, so 
that they shall not be taken unreasonably against the Grantor, and yet shall with Reason be 
extended most liberally for the Grantee’.75 Thus, the courts would allow contra proferentem to be 
trumped by the need to construe a deed reasonably. In Hill v Grange, for example, the defendant 
was required to pay rent at the Feast of the Annunciation and at Michaelmas. He argued that 
the rent was not due on the first Michaelmas of his lease, because the Annunciation was named 
first. The first rent, therefore, ought to be paid then, ‘for Reservations shall always be taken most 
strongly against the Reservors’. 76  The court refused to accept this argument, since the 
defendant’s interpretation would allow him to have ‘half a Year’s Profit, without paying any 
Rent for it’, which was ‘no Sort of Reason’.77 Even in Colthirst, the judges preferred to think in 
terms of finding a reasonable interpretation: none took up Saunders’ discussion of contra 
proferentem, but instead approved his conclusions on the basis that ‘Conditions have always a 
reasonable Construction’ or ‘Conditions have a reasonable Intendment’.78 Again, this was linked 
to the parties’ intentions: Hake, for example, argued that a contract should not be ‘expownded 
contrary to reason, which no doubte it sholde be if it were construed against the intent of the 
parties’.79 	
Saunders and Stanford JJ were two of the first lawyers to try their hands at a systematic 
exposition of contractual interpretation. However, their presentations of the principles used by 
the courts were relatively crude. Stanford J, for example, presented his three rules on an equal 
footing. Yet, as we have seen, construing a deed in accordance with the parties’ intentions was 
the overriding aim of the court, while the other two rules simply helped to establish the relevant 
intentions. Similarly, Saunders J conflated the contra proferentem rule, reasonableness, and 
																																																								
73 Colthirst v Bejushin (n 50) 29. See also, in the context of pleadings, Stradling v Morgan (1560) Plow 199, 
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other Point it is his Folly that he did not shew it precisely’. 
74 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 33) 161. 
75 ibid. Hake came to the same conclusion: Hake, Epieikeia (n 70) 55. 
76 Hill v Grange (n 58) 171. 
77 ibid 171a. 
78 Colthirst v Bejushin (n 50) 30, 34. 
79 Hake, Epieikeia (n 70) 55. 
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intention-based construction into a single approach, without explaining how they interacted 
with one another. 
 
Their accounts also demonstrate how closely the parties’ intentions were identified with 
what reasonable parties would have intended. For example, they would always want their deed 
to be effective, and to be treated even-handedly. Perhaps this is why judges never observed, as St 
German did, how difficult it was to discern the content of a man’s mind. Rather, they thought 
that intentions were so ‘apparent’ that ‘every Man may discover’ them, simply by referring to 
what was reasonable in the circumstances.80 They were not interested in the parties’ beliefs and 
motivations, but about the ‘reasonable and equal intention’ that could be extracted from their 
agreement.81 After all, a contract was a compromise between the two parties’ interests: it could 
be assumed that they must have come to a ‘reasonable and equal’ conclusion. 
 
D. Concep t i ons  o f  Con t rac tua l  In t en t i on  
 
The idiosyncrasies of this approach can be seen most clearly by comparing it with the 
construction of wills. It was well established that the testator’s intentions were of paramount 
importance for the interpretation of a will: as Henry Swinburne observed, ‘it is the mind and not 
the wordes of the testator, that giueth life to the testament’.82 Even Broke CJ admitted in 
Throckmerton that ‘in Testaments the Intent only shall be observed and considered’.83 However, 
when identifying the testator’s intention, the courts very rarely resorted to general principles or 
presumptions about what it would have been reasonable for him to intend. Rather, they focused 
on indications of his actual intentions, such as the will itself, or the surrounding circumstances.84 
The intentions of a testator simply could not be established by reference to a general standard of 
reasonableness. 
 
The intentions behind a deed, however, could. It is possible that this was a consequence 
of the courts’ developing understanding of contractual intentions. When judges first began to 
consider the intentions behind a deed, they referred exclusively to ‘the will of the donor’.85 By 
the sixteenth century, however, their language had shifted, and what now concerned them was 
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the ‘Intent of both the Parties’.86 This was a fundamental change: rather than expressing two 
parties’ separate intentions, a deed was coming to be seen as the embodiment of their single, 
common intention.  
 
The effects of this development can be seen in a number of mid-century cases, in which 
the courts struggled with the issue of whether a grant or reservation made by one party could be 
understood to be intended by both. For example, in Browning v Beston, the plaintiff argued that 
the ‘rent’ mentioned in his lease was void because it had been expressed as a grant by the lessee, 
rather than as a reservation by the lessor. He claimed that it would be ‘utterly against Reason to 
take the Words of one Person as the Words of another’.87 However, Sjt Morgan explained that 
this was the wrong way to think about the lease. He pointed out that debt could not be brought 
on the deed ‘except it be adjudged a Contract in Law, and a Contract cannot be without an 
Assent between two or more, wherefore the Assent of both Parties is the Perfection of the 
Contract’.88 Therefore, as Sjt Catlyn put it, ‘in Contracts it is not material which of the Parties 
speaks the Words, if the other agrees to them, for the Agreement of the Minds of the Parties is 
the only Thing the Law respects in Contracts’.89 Similarly, in Reniger v Fogossa, Sjt Pollard 
emphasised the minds of both the parties, defining an agreement as the ‘Union, Collection, 
Copulation and Conjunction of two or more Minds’.90  
 
Common lawyers, then, were beginning to think of a deed as the product of the parties’ 
common intention. This emphasis on ‘the agreement of the minds of the parties’ was connected 
by lawyers to their intention-based approach to interpretation. Again in Browning, Sjt Catlyn 
explained that ‘if any Persons are agreed upon a Thing… the Law always regards the Intention 
of the Parties, and will apply the Words to that which in common Presumption may be taken to 
be their Intent’.91 It was also recognised that this approach did not fit well with the contra 
proferentem rule: Sjts Stanford and Walsh argued that contra proferentem could not be applied to a 
deed made by multiple parties, ‘because the law makes each Party privy to the Speech of the 
other’.92 Perhaps this is why the courts often preferred to think in terms of reasonableness: it 
enabled them to arbitrate between the two parties without the need to distinguish between their 
individual intentions.93 																																																								
86 Chapman v Dalton (n 52) 290a. 
87 Browning v Beston (n 64) 136. 
88 ibid 138. 
89 ibid 140a. 
90 Reniger v Fogossa (1550) Plow 1, 17. 
91 Browning v Beston (n 64) 140. 
92 ibid 134. 
93 Alexander Lüderitz, Auslegung von Rechtsgeschäften: vergleichende Untersuchung anglo-amerikanischen und deutschen 
Rechts (Karlsruhe, C F Müller, 1966) 249. 
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Notably, this approach was very similar to the way they treated statutes. Like contracts, 
Acts of Parliament were made by multiple parties: ‘so manie statute makers, so many myndes.’94 
Again, the intentions behind the instrument were paramount, and the courts were inclined to 
identify the legislator’s intention with what they thought was reasonable. They used very similar 
presumptions: assuming, for example, that none of the Act had been intended to be void,95 and 
that Parliament would never intend to pass ‘a very unreasonable’ statute.96 Indeed, they were 
prepared to admit that these legislative intentions were sometimes all but fictional, constructed 
in order to legitimise the court’s preferred interpretation.97 
 
The courts, then, were developing a sophisticated conception of the parties’ intentions, 
based on the meeting of their minds. Because deeds were made by the agreement of multiple 
parties, it was impossible to interpret them in accordance with each party’s actual intentions. It 
was therefore necessary to construct notional reasonable parties, and the intentions that they 
would have had.98 This then freed lawyers to derive contractual intentions from their own ideas 
of reason, something that was notably absent from the interpretation of wills. Although lawyers 
of this period rarely engaged in explicit philosophising about the nature of contracts, their 
approach to interpretation reveals that a great deal of implicit theory was lying beneath the 
surface. 
 
E. In t e rp r e ta t i on  and  Equi ty  
 
It might be asked why the intentions of the parties were quite so important to lawyers of the 
sixteenth century. After all, Broke CJ had made a reasonable point: a great deal of ‘Confusion 
and Incertainty’ could be caused by the courts’ creative interpretations. Since there was so little 
contract law theory at the time, this question can best be answered by analogy with statutory 
interpretation. As we have seen, the courts took strikingly similar approaches to the construction 
of deeds and statutes. There was also a significant cross-pollination of ideas between the two 
areas. For example, in Bold v Molineux, counsel argued that deeds were ‘private laws between 
party and party’,99 and Fitzherbert and Baldwin JJ held that ‘the intention of the makers and 
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parties shall be expounded’ in both ‘deeds and statutes’.100 
 
These similarities did not escape lawyers of the time. Hake, for example, observed that 
‘in the exposition of deedes, contractes and willes it may be affirmed withowte absurdity that 
Equity in every of them beareth rule very greatly’.101 For Hake, equity was closely connected with 
the intentions of the parties. ‘At all tymes and in all ages,’ he declared, ‘the judges of the lawe 
have expownded bothe deedes and contractes not precisely or strictly according to ye words, 
[but] by Equity, that is to saye, according to the intent of the parties’.102 Similarly, statutes were 
‘taken and expownded according to the intent of those that were the makers of the same 
statute’.103 
 
We can, then, better understand the courts’ attachment to contractual intentions by 
examining their equitable construction of statutes. This was famously outlined by Plowden in his 
report of Eyston v Studd. He explained that ‘it is not the Words of the Law, but the internal Sense 
of it that makes the Law’, and warned that ‘it often happens that when you know the Letter, you 
know not the Sense, for sometimes the Sense is more confined and contracted than the Letter, 
and sometimes it is more large and extensive’.104 In order to determine whether equity should 
diminish or enlarge the words of a particular Act,  
 
it is a good Way, when you peruse a Statute, to suppose that the Law-maker is 
present, and that you have asked him the Question you want to know touching the 
Equity, then you must give yourself such an Answer as you imagine he would have 
done, if he had been present.105  
 
This could result in an interpretation that seemed quite contrary to the words of the 
statute. However, this was not a problem if it was ‘guided by the Intent of the Legislature… and 
according to that which is consonant to Reason and good Discretion’.106 Plowden compared the 
letter of the law to the shell of a nut, observing that ‘you will receive no Benefit by the Law, if 
you rely only upon the Letter’. Rather, ‘as the Fruit and Profit of the Nut lies in the Kernel, and 
not in the Shell, so the Fruit and Profit of the Law consists in the Sense more than in the 
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Letter’. 107  Sjt Saunders, likewise, explained that ‘Words, which are no other than the 
Verberation of the Air, do not constitute the Statute, but are only the Image of it’.108  
 
And the same was true of the words of a contract. As Sjt Catlyn had put it, ‘the 
Agreement of the Minds of the Parties is the only Thing the Law respects in Contracts’,109 and 
Saunders J argued that ‘the Words are no other than the Testimony of the Contract’.110 The 
words of the deed were only evidence of the parties’ intentions, and it was the latter that gave 
the contract its true force and meaning. 
 
IV. Two Approaches to Interpretation  
 
Contractual interpretation in the mid-sixteenth century, then, was primarily concerned with 
implementing the intentions of the parties. These could be discovered from the document itself; 
from the surrounding context; or from the court’s understanding of what reasonable parties 
would have wanted. It was understood that legal instruments gained their normative force from 
the intentions behind them, rather than the words that constituted them.  
 
This is a far cry from the ‘stiff and superstitious formalism’ we were promised. Indeed, in many 
ways it is very similar to the modern approach to interpretation. A lawyer from the sixteenth 
century, presented with Lord Hoffmann’s five ICS principles, would find much comfortingly 
familiar. He would readily agree, for example, that the meaning of a document was something 
very different from the meaning of its words, and that even unambiguous words should be given 
a different meaning if it seemed clear that the parties had made a mistake with their language.111 
 
The terminology of the ‘factual matrix’ would be new to him, but the concept would not 
be wholly foreign. There was a rule in his period that the words of a deed could not be varied by 
parol evidence,112 but evidence could certainly be admitted to show what the words meant.113 In 
Hawes v Davye, for example, Davye had agreed to pay Hawes £60 before 24 September if his 
ship took a prize. Davye argued that, if the ship did not take a prize, he was not bound to pay 
the £60 at all; Hawes, that the debt would fall due on 24 September if no prize was taken before 
then. The court looked to the circumstances behind the agreement to explain the term: ‘it well 																																																								
107 Eyston v Studd (n 104) 465. 
108 Partridge v Strange & Croker (1553) Plow 77, 82. 
109 Browning v Beston (n 64) 140a. 
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appears that the sum of £60 was due before the bond was made, and the extremity of the 
payment was deferred until 24 September’.114 In other cases, the judges considered supporting 
documents that helped to explain the intentions of the parties.115 
 
Elsewhere, however, our lawyer would be on less certain ground. He might find himself 
nonplussed by Lord Hoffmann’s definition of interpretation: ‘the ascertainment of the meaning 
which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge 
which would reasonably have been available to the parties’.116 At first glance, this looks very 
much like the approach of the early modern courts, but it is important not to exaggerate the 
similarities. While they clearly have much in common, the two approaches start from very 
different understandings of the nature of contracts and legal interpretation. 
 
Firstly, judges today ask themselves what meaning the document would convey to a 
reasonable reader. Sixteenth-century courts did not feel the need to introduce this cipher in 
order to distance themselves from their own interpretations.117 More importantly, however, they 
did not ask how a reader would understand the document at all. They were much more 
concerned with what they thought the writer must have meant by it: with what Chen-Wishart 
describes as ‘actor’, rather than ‘observer’, objectivity.118 While this may seem like a relatively 
minor distinction, it points to a conceptual gulf underlying the two courts’ invocations of 
reasonableness. 
 
In modern law, we ask ourselves how a reasonable person would understand the parties’ 
intentions, partly for pragmatic reasons (the impossibility of knowing their actual intentions), but 
partly because of substantive theories about the nature of legal instruments.119 Contracting 
parties are not bound to each other’s unexpressed whims; this would undermine certainty and 
prevent parties from planning their lives on the basis of their apparent contract.120 Observer 
objectivity is favoured for the fullness of the protection it gives to the reader’s expectations.121 
While we recognise that this approach may thwart the parties’ actual intentions, we find this 
justifiable given the other normative commitments of contract law. 																																																								
114 Hawes v Davye (1565) Dyer (109 SS) 119. 
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However, these kinds of concerns were not very important for sixteenth-century judges. 
Attitudes had changed dramatically since the medieval period: the courts now thought that it 
was better to have a fair result than a predictable one. Aside from Broke CJ’s abortive dissent in 
Throckmerton, and some passing references to the desirability of settling disputes,122 legal certainty 
was just not something the courts worried about. When they invoked reasonableness in the 
context of interpretation, it was not so that the parties would have a reliable text to work from; it 
was because they thought that the parties would have wanted to make a reasonable contract in 
the first place. There was no acknowledgment that injecting reason into a contract might thwart 
their real intentions, or that the parties might actively prefer a more literalist approach.123 
Indeed, in the context of statutes, lawyers brushed aside concerns that it might be difficult for 
laymen to understand the meaning of the text: even if the court’s interpretation was 
unpredictable, it would undoubtedly be just, and nobody could possibly take issue with that.124 
These approaches to interpretation, then, are products of convergent evolution. Two legal 
systems with very different commitments and values arrived at much the same result: 
interpretation based on the intentions of the parties, identified from what would have been 
reasonable in the circumstances.  
 
And our sixteenth century lawyer would also be unperturbed by other aspects of 
modern law. For example, much angst has been caused by contract law’s ‘interpretive turn’, in 
which previously free-standing legal doctrines have been rationalised as aspects of contractual 
interpretation. Carter and Courtney, for example, write that it is ‘easy to understand the 
reluctance to confront the suggestion that a material chunk of the common law can be explained 
simply in terms of what contracts “mean”’.125 Our lawyer would probably ask how else the law 
could be explained. Issues that are dealt with today by doctrines like mistake, frustration or 
implication were simply mopped up by interpretation.126 The interpretive turn is, in many ways, 
a return to contract law before contract law was invented in the nineteenth century. 
 
Critics of the law today fret that interpretation has become unprecedentedly creative, 
and is newly encroaching on domains that properly belong to other doctrines. Davies, for 																																																								
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example, has accused interpretation of ‘expanding beyond its proper scope’ into areas 
‘traditionally encompassed’ by the doctrines of implication and rectification. 127  There is 
widespread fear that we are journeying into the unknown: Wee argues that judges have ‘never’ 
before had such a ‘broad, unstructured and unfettered discretion’ to construe contracts.128 He 
predicts that ‘insurmountable theoretical and pragmatic problems’ will be the result,129 as the 
meaning of contracts becomes ‘dangerously unpredictable’ 130  and established rules are 
undermined.131 But interpretation has certainly gone as far and even further before. The 
reading of ‘reversion’ to mean ‘possession’ in Throckmerton was just as radical as a modern 
interpretation of ‘landlord’ to mean ‘tenant’,132 and rendered rectification just as unnecessary.133 
And this excursion into the past is not merely of antiquarian interest. Rather, it allows us to peer 
into the future. These critiques of the modern law could be equally applied to interpretation in 
the sixteenth century: how, then, did this earlier experiment with liberal interpretation play out? 
 
V. The Seventeenth Century and Beyond  
 
Firstly, it is clear that similar concerns were creeping in throughout the sixteenth century. 
Although they had not yet filtered through to the courts, complaints were beginning to appear 
in the literature of the time. Thomas Wilson castigated lawyers in his book on rhetoric, griping 
that,  
 
rather than fail, they will make doubts oftentimes where no doubt should be at all. 
‘Is his lease long enough,’ quod one? ‘Yea sir, it is very long,’ said a poor 
husbandman. ‘Then,’ quod he, ‘let me alone with it; I will find a hole in it, I 
warrant thee.’134 
 
Thomas Elyot lamented that it was impossible to ‘devise so sufficient an instrument, to bynde a 																																																								
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man to his promyse or covenaunt, but that there shall be some thinge therein espied to brynge it 
in argument’.135 Even Hake raised the argument that it might be ‘daungerous’ to allow judges 
too much discretion in interpreting, although he was quick to dismiss it.136 
 
  By the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, judges were beginning to express 
similar anxieties. These were part of a wider phase of uncertainty about the law: the intellectual 
blossoming of Renaissance scholarship, and the recent proliferation of printed texts, had left the 
legal profession floundering in a mass of new materials.137 Furthermore, litigation rates were 
rocketing to unprecedented levels, leading to accusations that the law was fomenting dispute and 
undermining social order.138 Lawyers were starting to point the finger at interpretation as a force 
behind both of these developments. 
 
  Edward Coke, for example, argued that the courts were spending too much time trying 
to save badly drafted contracts. Uncertainty in the law, he explained, was not caused by ‘any of 
the rules of the common law’, but by ‘conveyances and instruments made by men unlearned’,139 
which forced judges to ‘so often and so much perplex their heads, to make attonement and 
peace by construction of law between insensible and disagreeing words, sentences, and 
provisoes’.140 New and increasingly complex forms of drafting led to the ‘miserable slavery’ of 
legal uncertainty, since nobody could determine their meaning.141 Coke also criticised the 
parties in interpretation cases, whom he saw as ‘eagle-eyed’ predators, exploiting the law to raise 
questions about perfectly straightforward documents. 142  Their ‘strained’ and opportunistic 
constructions undermined conveyances, to ‘the disherison of the subject, and against the true 
reason and ancient rule of the law’.143 
 
  In response to these concerns, the courts’ approach to interpretation was evolving. The 
words the parties had chosen to use were associated ever more closely with their intentions: 
judges were increasingly likely to ask what ‘the intent and the words import’,144 and slid between 																																																								
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references to the meaning of the parties and the meaning of the document.145 They also began 
to present interpretation as a logical system of principles and maxims, rather than an 
amorphous discretion. The arguments in Shelley’s Case, for example, focused primarily on 
establishing the intentions of Edward Shelley, but the court’s decision was reported as a formal 
rule of law.146 Judges resorted to authority to bolster principles, like the contra proferentem rule, that 
had previously been taken for granted,147 or to support their interpretation of a particular word. 
In Edward Altham’s Case, for example, a dozen cases were cited to help define the word ‘right’,148 
whereas, thirty-five years earlier, Plowden had simply plucked his definition from ‘Reason… the 
Key which pierces and opens the Sense of obscure Words’.149 While intentions remained central 
to interpretation, the courts attempted to play this down, instead emphasising the words of the 
document, the primacy of legal rules, and the reliability of precedent. 
 
  Judges were also keen to stress that the parties’ intentions could not ride roughshod over 
existing legal rules. Typically, they now pronounced that ‘the law will not make an exposition 
against the express words and intent of the parties, when it may stand with the rule of law’: a 
striking change of emphasis.150 In The Lord Cromwel’s Case, for example, it was held that an 
interpretation of a contract based on reason must bow to established rules. ‘There should be no 
departure from common usage,’ the court maintained, ‘and those things which have had a 
certain interpretation should be changed least’.151 Coke approvingly quoted the philosopher 
Theophrastus: ‘he who seeks reason in everything, subverts reason’.152 Providing certainty for 
the parties was a growing preoccupation of the courts, and was again beginning to displace their 
dedication to finding a reasonable result. 
 
  However, the courts were by no means plunging headlong into literalism. Instead, they 
were trying to steer a middle course. Thus, while Coke rejected a law of interpretation that 
focused too much on reason, he also argued that a ‘nice and captious pretence of certainty, 
confounds true and legal certainty, and it is a bad exposition that corrupts and confounds the 
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text’.153 He was well aware that ‘a literal and strict construction’ could thwart the parties’ 
intentions,154 and argued that documents ‘should be liberally and beneficially expounded’ to 
quash opportunistic quibbling.155 The courts strove to find a balance between unrealistic strict 
construction and a broad-brush approach that failed to provide certainty.  
 
The next revolution in contractual interpretation, then, was a quiet one: unsettled by the 
uncertainties of liberal construction, the courts tacked towards a more predictable approach. 
While mid-century lawyers like Plowden and Hake had been supremely confident in the powers 
of interpretation, the next generation were more diffident. Their views of legal interpretation 




Revolutions in contractual interpretation are not a phenomenon new to English law. Arguably 
the greatest innovation came in the mid-sixteenth century, when the courts first began to engage 
in interpretation as a self-conscious and systematic activity. It does a disservice to the common 
law to ignore this fascinating period, or indeed to assume that all lawyers before the mid-
twentieth century suspended their intellectual faculties when presented with a contract to 
construe. In fact, examining earlier approaches to this perennial issue can help to provide a new 
perspective on the law of our own time. 
 
  On this view, it seems clear that recent changes to contractual interpretation follow a 
pattern that is well established in the history of the common law. The development of 
contractual interpretation has not been a straightforward progress; rather, it has oscillated 
between more or less liberal and literal approaches for centuries. Some of these shifts have been 
prompted by social and cultural changes: new technology, perhaps, or a more sophisticated 
understanding of language. They may also form part of a wider legal trend, as lawyers react to 
the perceived shortcomings of the past. Indeed, lawyers’ perceptions that their law is causing 
problems seem to have been much more influential than any complaints by laymen. 
 
  As a result, we should not be surprised if contractual interpretation continues to evolve: 
ICS was not the end of history. Indeed, adverse commentary on Lord Hoffmann’s approach is 
already having its effect, as the courts stress the importance of the parties’ words156 and 																																																								
153 Roger Earl of Rutland’s Case (n 143) 56b (‘et maledicta expositio est quae corrumpit et confundit textum’). 
154 ibid. 
155 Twyne’s Case (1601) 3 Co Rep 80b, 82a. 
156 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, 2908. 
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established legal rules157 in the context of construction. Lawyers will, undoubtedly, continue to 
argue over the best approach to interpretation. However, it is no defence of any theory to 
hearken wistfully back to the ‘traditional approach’ of English law. There is no such thing. The 
evolution of the common law of interpretation has been much more complex, and more 
interesting, than that. 
																																																								
157 Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742, 757. 
